How Aircraft Navigate During GPS Outages
by Christopher O'Keeffe
July 23, 2026
When the satellite signal disappears, an aircraft does not suddenly become lost. Modern aviation is built around layers of navigation: inertial systems, ground-based radio aids, air traffic control, conventional instrument approaches, visual references and carefully planned alternatives. GPS has transformed flight, but safe aviation has never depended on one signal alone.
A passenger looks at the moving map on the seatback screen.
The aircraft is crossing a coastline.
A small aeroplane symbol follows a perfect line towards the destination.
Distance remaining.
Ground speed.
Altitude.
Estimated arrival time.
Everything appears to depend on the satellite position displayed before them.
Then the map freezes.
The aircraft symbol stops moving.
Perhaps the display disappears altogether.
The aircraft itself continues flying.
The engines have not stopped.
The wings still produce lift.
The pilots still know the aircraft’s altitude, attitude, heading and speed.
Air traffic control is still available.
Other navigation systems remain operating.
A GPS outage is serious, particularly during an instrument approach or in remote airspace. It may require a new clearance, another approach, a diversion or even the cancellation of a flight before departure.
But it does not mean that the aircraft has suddenly lost every means of finding its way.
Aviation developed long before satellite navigation.
Many of the systems created during that earlier period remain available today, supported by inertial navigation, modern flight-management computers, radar surveillance and carefully designed contingency procedures.
GPS is now deeply integrated into aviation.
Redundancy remains equally important.
Important: This article provides general educational information. It is not flight instruction or operational guidance. Pilots and operators must use approved aircraft manuals, current aeronautical publications, company procedures, notices to airmen and instructions from the appropriate aviation authorities.
GPS Is Only One Part of GNSS
The terms GPS and GNSS are often used interchangeably, but they do not mean exactly the same thing.
GPS is the satellite-navigation system operated by the United States.
GNSS—Global Navigation Satellite System—is the broader term covering satellite constellations used to provide positioning, navigation and timing.
Depending on the aircraft and equipment, a receiver may use signals from systems such as:
In everyday discussion, people commonly describe any satellite-navigation problem as a GPS outage.
In aviation, the wider concern is usually GNSS interference or unavailability.
GNSS now contributes to far more than the moving map in the cockpit. CASA notes that it may support aircraft navigation, ADS-B surveillance, terrain-warning systems and some communication, flight-control and stability functions. This means interference can produce several apparently unrelated cockpit warnings at once.
What Can Cause a GPS Outage?
The phrase GPS outage can describe several different events.
They are not equally easy to recognise.
Satellite or System Unavailability
A satellite, augmentation service or related system may be temporarily unavailable because of maintenance, testing or technical failure.
Pilots and dispatchers may receive advance warning through official aeronautical notices.
Unintentional Interference
GNSS signals reaching the Earth are extremely weak.
CASA identifies potential sources of unintentional interference including radio equipment, repeaters, radar, microwave links, solar activity, ionospheric effects and equipment aboard an aircraft. These events may be intermittent and localised.

Jamming
Jamming overwhelms or blocks the legitimate satellite signal.
The receiver may:
Jamming is disruptive, but its failure can be obvious.
The system says it cannot provide a reliable position.
Spoofing
Spoofing is potentially more deceptive.
A counterfeit signal causes the receiver to calculate a position, speed or time that appears plausible but is wrong.
The screen may continue working.
The aircraft symbol may continue moving.
It may simply be moving in the wrong place.
EASA’s July 2026 guidance identifies discrepancies between navigation positions, abnormal speed comparisons, time shifts, false terrain warnings and deviations in combined inertial–GNSS positions as possible indications of spoofing.
This is why crews do not merely ask:
Is GPS available?
They must also ask:
Can the information be trusted?
Why GPS Matters So Much to Modern Aviation
Satellite navigation has allowed aircraft to follow accurate routes without flying directly from one ground beacon to another.
It supports:
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area navigation;
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performance-based navigation;
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efficient departures and arrivals;
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direct routing;
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oceanic operations;
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approaches at airports without traditional precision-landing systems;
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accurate aircraft tracking;
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terrain and obstacle awareness;
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aircraft clocks and timing;
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more efficient use of airspace.
The benefits are considerable.
Flights can follow carefully designed curved paths.
Aircraft can navigate accurately through regions with few ground-based facilities.
Airspace can be used more efficiently.
Fuel burn and unnecessary track miles can be reduced.
The difficulty is that one signal may feed several systems.
A GNSS problem may therefore affect:
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the flight-management position;
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required-navigation-performance capability;
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an RNAV departure or arrival;
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a satellite-based approach;
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ADS-B position reporting;
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terrain-warning calculations;
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the passenger moving map;
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automated time-dependent functions.
Aviation authorities have consequently placed growing emphasis on recognising interference early and preserving independent navigation capabilities.
EASA updated its GNSS safety bulletin on 3 July 2026 in response to increasingly serious and sophisticated jamming and spoofing. Its recommendations include retaining operational ground infrastructure such as ILS, DME and VOR and developing contingency plans for interference events.
An Aircraft Does Not Rely on One Map or One Sensor
A modern flight deck combines information from several sources.
Exactly which systems are available depends on:
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the aircraft;
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its age;
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installed equipment;
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operator approvals;
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route;
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airspace;
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airport;
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maintenance status.
A long-range airliner may have multiple inertial systems, several GNSS receivers, DME equipment, VOR receivers and sophisticated flight-management computers.

A regional turboprop may have a different combination.
A light training aircraft may depend more heavily on visual navigation, a single GNSS receiver and conventional radio aids.
There is no universal fallback that applies identically to every aircraft.
The principle is universal:
Do not rely upon information that cannot be verified.
CASA recommends cross-checking GNSS position with ground features, inertial or flight-management information, NDB, VOR, DME and surveillance information from air traffic control.
The Principal Navigation Systems Available Without GPS
| System |
Independent of GPS? |
What it provides |
| Inertial navigation system |
Yes, once aligned |
Continuously calculated position, velocity, heading and attitude |
| VOR |
Yes |
Bearing or radial to or from a ground transmitter |
| DME |
Yes |
Distance from a ground station |
| DME/DME area navigation |
Yes |
Position calculated from distances to multiple DME stations |
| NDB/ADF |
Yes |
Direction towards a ground beacon |
| ILS or localiser |
Yes |
Runway-aligned approach guidance |
| Conventional radar |
Yes |
Ground-based surveillance and possible controller vectors |
| ADS-B |
Often GNSS-dependent |
Broadcast aircraft position; may be degraded by GNSS interference |
| Visual navigation |
Yes |
Position determined from identifiable ground features |
| Approved aeronautical charts |
Yes |
Routes, terrain, procedures, frequencies and navigation infrastructure |
The presence of a system does not automatically mean that it can be used for every route or procedure.
Aircraft certification, crew qualification, service coverage and current operational status all matter.
1. Inertial Navigation Systems
An inertial navigation system does not need to receive a signal from outside the aircraft to continue operating.
It uses gyroscopes and accelerometers to measure movement.
Before departure, the system is aligned with a known position. Once the aircraft begins moving, it continually calculates how the aircraft’s position changes.

The system senses:
From this, it calculates:
The FAA describes inertial reference units as self-contained systems that use gyroscopes and accelerometers to continuously calculate position and velocity after alignment.
The Strength of Inertial Navigation
Inertial navigation is independent.
It does not require:
That makes it particularly valuable:
If GNSS is lost, an aircraft’s inertial systems can continue estimating position.
The aircraft does not immediately become geographically blind.
The Limitation: Drift
An inertial system calculates position by measuring movement from its last known position.
Small measurement errors accumulate.
Over time, the calculated position can gradually diverge from the aircraft’s true position. This is known as inertial drift.
GNSS normally helps correct that drift.
DME or other navigation sources may also update the aircraft’s position.
If GNSS remains unavailable for an extended period, crews and flight-management systems must monitor the quality of the inertial solution and cross-check it against any other available information.
The inertial system keeps calculating.
It is not assumed to remain perfect indefinitely.
2. Distance Measuring Equipment
Distance Measuring Equipment—DME—allows a suitably equipped aircraft to determine its distance from a ground station.
The aircraft sends a radio interrogation.
The ground station replies.
The airborne equipment calculates distance from the elapsed time.
Airservices Australia describes DME as providing slant-range distance between the aircraft and the ground station. DME is used during en-route and terminal operations and is often paired with VOR or ILS facilities.
One DME station provides distance.
Two or more suitably positioned stations can provide much more.
3. DME/DME Area Navigation
A flight-management system can measure distance from multiple DME stations and calculate the aircraft’s position from where those distance arcs intersect.
This is known as DME/DME navigation.
Combine DME information with an inertial reference unit and the aircraft may retain an effective area-navigation capability without GPS.
The aircraft can potentially continue following routes defined by waypoints rather than being limited to flying directly towards each radio beacon.
The FAA identifies DME/DME/IRU as an independent non-GPS capability and retains DME infrastructure specifically to provide resilient backup for satellite-based navigation.

The Limitation
DME/DME navigation depends on:
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suitable airborne equipment;
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working ground stations;
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adequate geometric spacing between those stations;
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the route or procedure being authorised for that navigation method;
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sufficient signal coverage at the aircraft’s position and altitude.
It is extremely useful where the infrastructure exists.
It is not universally available across every ocean, desert or remote region.
4. VOR Navigation
VOR stands for VHF Omnidirectional Range.
A VOR ground station transmits a signal that allows an aircraft to determine its bearing relative to the station.
A pilot can identify:
-
which radial the aircraft is on;
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whether the aircraft is tracking towards or away from the station;
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how to intercept and maintain a selected course.
Airservices describes VOR as a course-forming aid providing bearing information for en-route navigation and non-precision approach procedures.
Before RNAV and GPS became dominant, airways were often organised around VOR stations.
Aircraft flew from beacon to beacon.
Those systems have not disappeared entirely.
The American VOR Minimum Operational Network
The United States is progressively reducing its larger historical VOR network while retaining a carefully selected backup known as the VOR Minimum Operational Network.
The FAA says the network is intended to allow aircraft that have lost GPS to:
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continue through the affected area using conventional VOR navigation; or
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proceed to an airport where a GPS-independent ILS, localiser or VOR approach can be flown.
The design provides a suitable airport within 100 nautical miles at specified operating altitudes across the contiguous United States.
It is an example of a wider aviation principle:
Satellite navigation may be primary.
A smaller terrestrial network remains available for resilience.
5. Australia’s Backup Navigation Network
Australia has also retained a Backup Navigation Network of terrestrial navigation aids.
Airservices describes the BNN as a contingency capability intended to support the safe completion of flight in the rare event of a GNSS failure.
Depending on the location and available infrastructure, conventional facilities may include:
Australia presents a distinctive challenge.
The continent is immense.
Communities and aerodromes may be separated by great distances.
Large areas lie beyond conventional radar coverage.
Ground navigation infrastructure cannot be as dense as it is around heavily populated parts of Europe or North America.
This is why pre-flight planning matters.
A pilot cannot assume that the same combination of alternative navigation aids will be available everywhere.
6. Non-Directional Beacons
A Non-Directional Beacon—NDB—transmits a radio signal in every direction.
An aircraft equipped with an Automatic Direction Finder can determine the direction towards that beacon.
The system is older and less precise than many modern alternatives.
It can also be affected by:
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atmospheric conditions;
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coastlines;
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electrical interference;
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signal bending;
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terrain.
Nevertheless, selected NDBs still serve operational or contingency purposes in some regions.
Airservices notes that an aircraft can follow the indication of its ADF instrument towards an NDB.
NDBs illustrate an important point.
Older does not always mean useless.
A simple independent system may retain value precisely because it does not depend on the technology that has failed.
7. Instrument Landing Systems
An Instrument Landing System—ILS—provides precise radio guidance towards a runway.
It normally includes:
-
a localiser, giving lateral guidance towards the runway centreline;
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a glide path, giving vertical guidance towards the runway.
These signals are transmitted from antennas at the airport.
They do not require the aircraft to derive its final approach path from GPS.
Airservices describes ILS as a highly accurate radio navigation aid used for landing during poor weather or low visibility.
This makes ILS one of aviation’s most important GPS-independent landing systems.

Not Every Precision Approach Is GPS-Independent
Passengers may assume that every modern precision approach works in the same way.
It does not.
A conventional ILS uses its own runway-based radio signals.
A Ground-Based Augmentation System—GBAS—uses corrected GNSS signals to provide precision guidance.
Airservices explicitly identifies GBAS as a landing system that depends on GNSS.
During serious GNSS interference:
The runway may be open.
The originally planned approach may no longer be available.
The crew and air traffic control may need to select another one.
8. Localiser, VOR and Other Conventional Approaches
Where ILS is unavailable, an airport may have another approved instrument procedure based on:
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localiser guidance;
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VOR;
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VOR/DME;
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NDB;
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radar;
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visual references.
These approaches have different:
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accuracy;
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equipment requirements;
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weather minima;
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terrain clearances;
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pilot qualifications;
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operational limitations.
An aircraft that cannot use its planned GNSS approach may still be able to land using another procedure.
But this depends entirely on:
A suitable conventional approach at one airport does not imply that the destination runway has one.
That is why alternates are selected during flight planning.
9. Air Traffic Control Radar Vectors
Air traffic controllers can provide headings to guide an aircraft through controlled airspace when appropriate surveillance and procedures are available.
This is commonly called radar vectoring.
Ground radar does not require the aircraft to know its own GPS position.
Airservices uses terminal-area radar and en-route radar to assist in separating aircraft. Primary radar detects reflected radio energy, while secondary radar interrogates an aircraft’s transponder.
A controller may be able to:
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observe the aircraft;
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identify that its reported position is wrong;
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issue headings;
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guide it towards a conventional approach;
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direct it away from traffic or terrain;
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assist with navigation.
CASA specifically lists ATC surveillance information and ATC vectors among the alternatives that may help during GNSS interference.
Radar Has Limits
Radar assistance depends on:
Radar is strong near many major airports.
It may be unavailable at low level or in remote airspace.
Nor should radar be confused with ADS-B.
ADS-B May Also Be Affected
ADS-B stands for Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast.
The word dependent is important.
An ADS-B-equipped aircraft broadcasts position and other information derived from its onboard navigation systems. Airservices receives these transmissions through ground stations and presents them to controllers.
In Australian airspace, GNSS is the sole source of aircraft position used by ADS-B systems, according to CASA. Severe GNSS interference can therefore affect both the aircraft’s own navigation and the position seen by air traffic control through ADS-B.
This does not mean that air traffic control disappears.
Other surveillance may remain available:
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primary radar;
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secondary radar;
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multilateration;
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position reports;
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procedural separation.
But the available service may change.
Routes may be restricted.
Separation may need to increase.
Traffic capacity may fall.
Flights may be delayed or rerouted to keep the system safe.
Procedural Separation When Surveillance Is Limited
Not every aircraft is continuously visible on radar.
This has always been true in oceanic and remote airspace.
Where radar or satellite-derived surveillance is unavailable, controllers can separate aircraft using procedural methods based on:
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cleared routes;
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altitude;
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time;
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speed;
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estimated position;
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pilot reports;
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expected progress.
Airservices confirms that in airspace without radar or satellite-based surveillance, separation may be maintained using time and estimated position.
Procedural control generally requires larger margins than high-quality surveillance.
It may reduce the number of aircraft that can use a route or altitude.
It remains a proven method of managing traffic when controllers cannot watch every aircraft move continuously across a screen.
Visual Navigation
Not every flight is conducted entirely by reference to instruments.
Under Visual Flight Rules, pilots may navigate by comparing the landscape with an approved chart.
They identify:
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coastlines;
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highways;
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rivers;
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towns;
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railway lines;
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ranges;
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lakes;
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airfields;
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distinctive terrain.
They estimate:
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heading;
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groundspeed;
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time;
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distance;
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drift caused by wind.
This is sometimes described as pilotage and dead reckoning.
GPS makes visual navigation easier by providing an immediate position.
It does not remove the value of recognising the world outside the cockpit.
CASA recommends using ground features to cross-check position when GNSS interference is possible.
In suitable conditions, a clearly identified coastline, highway or town may provide more trustworthy information than a satellite position that has begun to drift or lie.
How a Flight Crew Responds to GPS Loss
The precise response depends on the aircraft and operator.
A high-level sequence may involve the following.
1. Fly the Aircraft
The first responsibility is always control.
A navigation failure must not distract the crew from maintaining:
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safe attitude;
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altitude;
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airspeed;
-
heading;
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terrain clearance.
CASA’s guidance begins with maintaining control and using the last reliable navigation information as the basis for the initial response.

2. Recognise the Problem
The crew examines whether the issue is:
Clues may include:
3. Cross-Check Independent Sources
The crew compares:
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inertial positions;
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DME distances;
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VOR indications;
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radar or ATC information;
-
visual landmarks;
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the expected route;
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aircraft heading and speed;
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multiple navigation displays.
A position that cannot be independently verified is treated cautiously.
4. Change Navigation Source
Where available and approved, the crew may revert to:
CASA’s published guidance specifically lists VOR, DME, ILS and ATC vectors as possible alternatives.
5. Notify Air Traffic Control
The crew advises ATC as soon as practical.
This helps controllers:
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verify the aircraft’s position;
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identify a wider interference event;
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protect surrounding traffic;
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issue another route;
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provide vectors;
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coordinate a different approach or destination.
Reports from several aircraft may reveal that the problem affects an entire region rather than one aeroplane.
6. Reassess the Flight
The crew and airline operations team may reconsider:
The aircraft may continue normally.
It may need a different runway or arrival.
It may divert.
The safest answer depends on the complete situation, not merely whether one GPS warning has appeared.
What Happens During Departure?
A GNSS problem discovered before departure may remove the planned RNAV departure procedure.
The flight may require:
A flight is not dispatched merely because the engines and wings are serviceable.
The required navigation capability must also be available for:
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departure;
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route;
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arrival;
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approach;
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diversion.
Sometimes the safest response to a forecast outage is to remain on the ground.
What Happens En Route?
At cruising altitude, several alternatives may be available.
A transport aircraft may continue using:
The crew continues checking the aircraft’s position and navigation accuracy.
If the outage is localised, the GNSS signal may return after the aircraft leaves the affected area.
That does not mean the crew immediately trusts every restored indication.
A signal that has been spoofed may contaminate a combined GNSS–inertial position. EASA warns of potential deviations in hybrid IRS/GNSS positions during spoofing.
Restoration must be verified.
What Happens Over the Ocean?
Over the ocean, there may be no VOR or DME stations within range.
Inertial navigation becomes particularly important.
Long-range aircraft have historically crossed oceans using combinations of:
Modern aircraft ordinarily use satellite-updated inertial systems and advanced flight-management computers.
During GNSS loss, the inertial system can continue navigating, but its accuracy must be monitored because drift increases over time.
The crew may also need to:
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report degraded capability;
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follow oceanic contingency procedures;
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provide position estimates;
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accept different routing or separation;
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reconsider the destination or alternate.
The FAA requires specified commercial IFR operators to retain an independent non-GPS capability for many operations, identifying DME/DME, inertial and VOR systems as examples for en-route and terminal use.
What Happens During Arrival and Approach?
Arrival and landing can be the most operationally sensitive stage.
A GNSS outage may make unavailable:
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an RNAV arrival;
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an RNP arrival;
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a satellite-based approach;
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a GBAS landing procedure;
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automated waypoint sequencing dependent on GNSS.
The crew and ATC may substitute:
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radar vectors;
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a VOR arrival;
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a conventional holding pattern;
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an ILS;
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a localiser approach;
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a VOR or VOR/DME approach;
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a visual approach in suitable weather;
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another runway;
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another airport.
The decision depends heavily on weather.
In clear conditions, a visual approach may be straightforward.
In cloud, rain, fog or low visibility, losing the only suitable approach may make a diversion necessary.
The destination may remain physically open while becoming operationally unsuitable for that aircraft at that time.
Why Spoofing Is More Difficult Than a Simple Outage
A clear failure can be managed.
The receiver says:
GPS unavailable.
The crew changes source.
Spoofing is harder because the receiver may continue claiming that everything is normal.
An incorrect position may spread into:
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the flight-management system;
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the moving map;
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ADS-B;
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terrain-warning calculations;
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automated navigation;
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estimated arrival times;
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other systems using GNSS time or position.
The false information can look internally consistent.
This makes independent cross-checking essential.
A VOR radial, DME distance, radar position, visual landmark or separate inertial solution may reveal that the satellite position cannot be correct.
The lesson is not unique to aviation.
Failure is often easier to manage than deception.
A screen that goes blank announces its weakness.
A screen that confidently displays the wrong answer demands judgement.
Would Passengers Notice?
Often, passengers would notice nothing.
The aircraft may continue on the same route using other navigation sources.
A passenger might see:
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the moving map freeze;
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the displayed route disappear;
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an incorrect time or position;
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a longer flight path;
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a holding pattern;
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an unexpected runway;
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a diversion;
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a delay before departure.
The flight crew may be managing a complex technical event while the aircraft remains smooth and apparently normal.
A frozen entertainment-system map does not prove that the pilots have lost navigation.
The passenger display is not the aircraft’s primary flight-navigation system.
It may simply have lost access to the position data used to animate the map.
Can an Aircraft Land Without GPS?
Yes—provided a suitable approved alternative is available.
An aircraft may land using:
The answer is not simply yes for every airport and every weather condition.
A particular airport may rely heavily on GNSS procedures.
The conventional aid may be unavailable.
The aircraft may not carry the required receiver.
The crew may not be authorised for that procedure.
The cloud base may be too low.
The crosswind may prevent use of the runway served by the surviving approach.
In that case, the aircraft lands somewhere else.
Diversion is not evidence that every other system failed.
It is evidence that the remaining combination of runway, weather, aircraft and approach did not provide the required safety margin.
Why Flights May Be Delayed, Rerouted or Cancelled
Aviation safety is built around margins.
A flight may be disrupted because a GPS outage affects:
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the only authorised departure;
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an oceanic navigation requirement;
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an RNP route;
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the destination’s only suitable approach;
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ADS-B surveillance capability;
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fuel assumptions;
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alternate-airport availability;
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airspace capacity.
EASA notes that GNSS interference may lead to rerouting or diversion.
Even when individual aircraft can continue safely, the air-traffic system may handle fewer flights.
Greater spacing may be required.
Direct routes may be unavailable.
Aircraft may need to remain on conventional airways.
Controllers may have more work.
A resilient system can remain safe while becoming less efficient.
That is precisely what contingency capability is intended to achieve.
Do Pilots Still Use Paper Charts?
Pilots still need current charts and procedures.
The delivery format may be:
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approved electronic flight bags;
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installed cockpit displays;
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paper charts;
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combinations providing the required redundancy.
Operational aviation charts may show:
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controlled airspace;
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airways;
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navigation aids;
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reporting points;
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frequencies;
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terrain;
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minimum altitudes;
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departures;
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arrivals;
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instrument approaches;
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holding procedures;
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missed approaches.
A chart does not calculate a live position.
It provides the geographic and procedural framework within which navigation occurs.
Electronic charts are now common because they can be updated and carried efficiently.
But the underlying requirement has not changed.
The information must be:
Mapworld’s Aviation and Broad-Area Mapping
Mapworld supplies several map types connected with aviation history, regional understanding, training and broad-area reference.
They are not substitutes for current approved operational aeronautical publications.
Operational Navigation Charts
Operational Navigation Charts were originally developed for aviation at a scale of 1:1,000,000.
They combine broad topographic and aviation-related information, including features such as:
Mapworld’s current ONC products—including sheets such as Australia Q-14 and Australia S-11—are best regarded as educational, historical, planning or display maps unless explicitly confirmed as current and approved for an operational purpose. Several product listings expressly state that they are not for navigational use.
An ONC map can help someone understand the scale of a region.
It cannot replace the approved, current charts, databases and procedures required to fly through it.
Australia Wall Maps
A large wall map of Australia can show:
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the immense distance between regional centres;
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the relationship between coast and interior;
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remote communities;
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mountain systems;
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deserts;
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major transport corridors;
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the geographic challenge facing regional aviation.
This wider view is useful in:
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training rooms;
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aviation offices;
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airline planning environments;
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schools;
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emergency-service facilities;
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government;
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aeromedical organisations.
World Maps
A large world map helps explain:
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great-circle relationships;
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oceanic routes;
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polar routes;
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international diversion geography;
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the position of aviation corridors;
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why aircraft may appear to fly curved routes on a flat screen.
Topographic Maps
Mapworld’s Australian Topographic Maps collection provides detailed terrain and regional mapping in a range of scales.
These maps are suited to terrestrial planning, education, terrain study, emergency coordination and geographic reference.
They are not automatically approved aviation charts.
Wall Maps for Briefing and Training
The Wall Maps collection includes world, Australia, regional, physical, political and historical maps available in paper, laminated, canvas and selected timber hang-railed formats.
Laminated maps can support:
Mapworld and Australian Aviation
Mapworld’s connection with aviation extends beyond one chart series.
For more than 30 years, Mapworld has supplied broad-area maps, topographic maps, navigation products and planning resources to professional and institutional users.
Royal Flying Doctor Service
Mapworld and the Royal Flying Doctor Service examines the importance of mapping across aeromedical, ground-support and remote-area operations.
The article makes a vital distinction:
Approved aviation systems guide the aircraft.
Road maps, topographic maps, wall maps and ground GPS devices help teams understand and reach the immense regions surrounding those flights.
Mapworld’s ONC products, regional maps and large wall maps have supported appropriate planning, training and reference uses, while operational flight navigation remains governed by approved aviation equipment and publications.
Defence and Government
Mapworld and the Military describes more than three decades supplying wall maps, topographic maps, compasses, GPS systems and specialist mapping to Defence customers.
Mapworld and Government examines the role of large-format geographic references in briefing rooms, policy offices, embassies and operational environments.
Aviation Heritage
The Trans Australia Airlines Aviation Map of Australia 1948 shows an earlier era of Australian aviation, including historic air routes, flight distances and illustrations of aircraft then in service.
It belongs on a wall rather than in a modern cockpit.
But it reminds us how far aviation has travelled—from radio beacons, dead reckoning and paper plots to satellite-guided performance-based navigation.
What Aviation Teaches Us About Navigation
Aviation does not reject new technology.
It embraces it.
Satellite navigation has improved accuracy, efficiency, access and safety.
What aviation resists is dependence without contingency.
A safe flight is rarely built around one perfect system.
It is built around layers:
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multiple sensors;
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independent sources;
-
cross-checks;
-
trained crews;
-
air traffic control;
-
current charts;
-
alternate airports;
-
reserve fuel;
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established procedures.
This is why aircraft can continue operating when a satellite signal is lost.
Not because GPS is unimportant.
Because it is important enough that aviation plans for its absence.
The same principle applies beyond the cockpit.
A driver should understand the broad route before following spoken instructions.
A skipper should understand the coastline beyond the vessel icon.
An emergency service should retain maps that can be shared and marked.
A school should teach students where places are, not only how to search for them.
A technological society is strongest when it retains the knowledge needed to continue without one of its technologies.
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Final Thoughts
When GPS disappears, an aircraft does not return instantly to the age of guesswork.
It changes the way it navigates.
The flight-management system may rely more heavily on inertial information.
DME stations may update the aircraft’s position.
VORs may define the route.
Air traffic control may provide headings.
An ILS may guide the aircraft towards the runway.
Visual landmarks may confirm the aircraft’s position.
Approved charts continue to show the structure of the airspace and the procedures available within it.
The flight may take longer.
It may follow a less efficient route.
It may land on another runway.
It may divert to another airport.
But these are managed responses.
They are evidence of redundancy working.
Satellite navigation has allowed aviation to become more precise and efficient than ever before.
It has not removed the need for independent systems, geographic understanding or professional judgement.
A GPS receiver provides a position.
Navigation requires more.
It requires knowing whether that position is credible.
Understanding what surrounds it.
Recognising what remains available when it fails.
And having another way to reach safety when the signal disappears.
That is why aviation retains inertial systems.
Ground beacons.
Radar.
Instrument-landing systems.
Charts.
Alternates.
Procedures.
And crews trained to use them.
GPS may be the primary source.
It must never become the only answer.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can aircraft fly without GPS?
Yes. Depending on their equipment and route, aircraft may navigate using inertial systems, VOR, DME, DME/DME, NDB, air traffic control vectors, visual references and conventional instrument procedures.
Does a GPS outage affect the aircraft’s engines or flight controls?
A GPS outage is primarily a navigation, surveillance and systems-information problem. It does not itself stop the engines or remove aerodynamic control of the aircraft. It may, however, affect integrated systems that use GNSS information.
What is the difference between GPS and GNSS?
GPS is the United States satellite-navigation constellation. GNSS is the broader term covering satellite-navigation systems including GPS, Galileo, GLONASS and BeiDou.
What is GPS jamming?
Jamming overwhelms or blocks legitimate satellite signals, preventing or degrading reception.
What is GPS spoofing?
Spoofing broadcasts counterfeit signals that cause the receiver to calculate a false position, speed or time.
Why is spoofing more dangerous?
A clear outage produces an obvious warning. Spoofing may allow the system to continue displaying information that appears normal but is wrong.
How does inertial navigation work?
Gyroscopes and accelerometers measure the aircraft’s movement from a known starting position. The system continually calculates position, velocity, heading and attitude without receiving an external navigation signal.
Does inertial navigation remain accurate indefinitely?
No. Small measurement errors accumulate, causing the calculated position to drift over time. Other sources such as GNSS or DME normally help correct it.
What is VOR?
VOR is a terrestrial radio-navigation system that allows an aircraft to determine its bearing relative to a ground station and track towards or away from it.
What is DME?
Distance Measuring Equipment calculates the aircraft’s distance from a ground station.
What is DME/DME navigation?
The aircraft measures its distance from multiple DME stations and uses those distances to calculate its position. When combined with inertial information, it can provide GPS-independent area navigation.
Can air traffic control guide an aircraft without GPS?
Where suitable radar or other surveillance is available, controllers may provide headings and navigational assistance. In non-surveillance airspace, procedural separation and position reports may be used.
Is ADS-B independent of GPS?
Usually not. ADS-B broadcasts position derived from an aircraft’s onboard navigation system, and Australian ADS-B position reporting relies on GNSS. Severe interference may therefore affect both navigation and surveillance.
Can an aircraft land without GPS?
Yes, where a suitable alternative exists. Possibilities include ILS, localiser, VOR, VOR/DME, NDB, radar or visual approaches.
Is ILS dependent on GPS?
A conventional ILS uses radio transmitters installed near the runway and is independent of GPS. GBAS and satellite-based approaches use GNSS and may be affected by interference.
What happens if the destination has only a GPS approach?
The flight may need another runway, another approach, better visual weather or a diversion to an airport with a usable alternative.
Do pilots carry paper maps?
Pilots require approved and current aeronautical charts and procedures. These may be supplied through electronic flight bags, installed cockpit systems, paper charts or an approved redundant combination.
Can Mapworld ONC charts be used for flying?
Mapworld’s current ONC charts are primarily historical, educational, planning and display products. Unless explicitly certified and current for a particular operational purpose, they must not be used for flight navigation.
What is Australia’s Backup Navigation Network?
It is a retained network of terrestrial navigation aids intended to support the safe completion of flight during a rare widespread GNSS failure.
Would passengers know that GPS had failed?
Often they would not. The passenger moving map may freeze or disappear, but the aircraft may continue using other navigation systems without a noticeable change.
Where can I buy aviation-related maps in Australia?
Mapworld stocks ONC charts, historical aviation maps, topographic maps, Australia maps, world maps and large-format wall maps for appropriate reference, education, planning and display purposes.
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Christopher O'Keeffe
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